What reshoring is and how it is measured
Reshoring is the return of manufacturing to the United States from a foreign location, most often China. As of October 2026, the evidence is split: announcements of reshored and foreign-invested manufacturing jobs held steady at about 247,000 in 2025, while US imports of manufactured goods from Asian low-cost countries still grew faster than US factory output.
Two sources dominate the data, and they measure different things:
- The Reshoring Initiative, an industry association, publishes an annual report built from a database of more than 8,000 cases drawn from published articles and company announcements. It counts reshoring together with foreign direct investment (FDI — a foreign company building or buying production capacity in the US), and it counts announced manufacturing jobs, not jobs filled. Its figures are not Bureau of Labor Statistics employment counts.
- Kearney's Reshoring Index, published annually by the consultancy, compares US imports of manufactured goods from 14 Asian low-cost countries and regions with US domestic manufacturing gross output, using USITC and BEA data. A negative reading means those imports gained on domestic production.
The first measures intentions; the second measures trade flows. Both are needed, because they point in different directions. The Reshoring Initiative's report is the source for the job figures on this page (Reshoring Initiative 2025 Annual Report, including 1H 2026 data).
Announced reshoring and FDI jobs in 2025
The Reshoring Initiative recorded about 247,000 announced reshoring plus FDI manufacturing jobs in 2025. The report describes that as "essentially matching 2024" and as the fifth straight year above 240,000. Its own headline, however, reads "2025 down 5%; Projected 2026 up 25%." The report does not reconcile the two descriptions in the passages reviewed for this page.
The cumulative totals are also inconsistent within the same report. The executive summary says "more than 2.3 million" jobs have been announced since 2010; chapter 1 says "more than 2.8 million," and adds that about 1.8 million of those have been filled. The safest reading is the one the report itself supports in both places: announced totals are in the low millions since 2010, and a meaningful share of announced jobs has not yet been filled.
The projected 25% increase for 2026 is based on annualized first-half 2026 data. It is a projection, not a count.
The counter-measure: imports kept growing
Kearney's 2026 Reshoring Index was −86 for 2025, after −115 for 2024. The US manufacturing import ratio — imports from the 14 Asian low-cost countries and regions as a share of US domestic manufactured gross output — rose to 14.15% from 13.29%. US manufactured goods output fell by US$28 billion, or 0.4%, and Kearney's US self-sufficiency index fell to 2.30, which Kearney calls "the lowest value in a decade" (Kearney 2026 Reshoring Index).
| Measure | 2025 result | What it counts |
|---|---|---|
| Reshoring Initiative announced jobs | About 247,000 | Announced reshoring plus FDI manufacturing jobs |
| Kearney Reshoring Index | −86 (2024: −115) | Change in imports from 14 Asian low-cost countries relative to US output |
| Manufacturing import ratio | 14.15% (2024: 13.29%) | Those imports as a share of US manufactured gross output |
| US manufactured goods output | −US$28B (−0.4%) | Domestic production |
The most telling detail is where the imports came from. Direct US imports from mainland China fell by almost one-third, or about US$135 billion, while the other 13 Asian low-cost countries and regions gained about US$194 billion. Kearney's index is a consultancy product, not official statistics, but its result matches the Reshoring Initiative's own observation that under the first Trump-era tariffs "many imports simply shifted from China to other low-cost countries rather than returning to the United States."
Both things are true at once. Companies are announcing US plants at a steady rate, and the US is still importing more manufactured goods relative to what it makes.
Which industries are reshoring
By announced jobs in 2025, four industries led the Reshoring Initiative's count (Exhibit 2.1):
| Industry | Announced jobs, 2025 |
|---|---|
| Transportation equipment | 48,786 |
| Computer and electronic products | 44,877 |
| Chemicals, including pharmaceuticals | 37,265 |
| Electrical equipment, including EV batteries | 36,188 |
Kearney's index gives a different view by product category. The categories whose own Reshoring Index turned slightly positive in 2025 — meaning domestic output gained a little on Asian imports — were textiles, fabrics, furniture, miscellaneous manufactured goods and electrical equipment. According to Kearney (p.13), those categories accounted for about US$400 billion, or 40%, of 2025 imports from Asian low-cost countries. Electrical equipment is the one category that appears on both lists.
Where reshored production comes from
Among 2025 cases that report a source country, the Reshoring Initiative's Exhibit 4.2 ranks origins by jobs:
- South Korea: 24,521 jobs (23%).
- China: 11,260 jobs (11%).
- Mexico: 10,368 jobs (10%).
By number of cases rather than jobs, China is "the largest source of reshoring activity," at about two-thirds of reshoring cases that report an origin (p.16). The two rankings differ because they count different things: a case count weights every announcement equally, while a job count weights large plants heavily. For an importer sourcing from China, the case count is the more useful signal, because it shows how many companies have decided to bring production back, whatever their size.
Tariffs, incentives and the cost gap
The Reshoring Initiative tracks the reasons companies cite. In 2025, citations of government incentives fell about 38% from 2024, which the report links to "a shift in federal policy emphasis from the Biden administration's IRA and CHIPS subsidies toward the Trump administration's tariffs." The two incentive laws are the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which funds semiconductor manufacturing, and the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which provides clean-energy manufacturing credits. The report's assessment is that incentives "are enough to influence the decision of where to locate in the U.S., but not, on their own, enough to offset higher U.S. costs."
Tariff citations rose more than twelvefold from 2024. They then declined in the first half of 2026, after the Supreme Court held on 20 February 2026 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize tariffs (Supreme Court opinion, No. 24-1287). That ruling removed the IEEPA tariff layers; Section 301 and Section 232 duties were not affected.
The report also offers its own estimate of how far tariffs go: "Tariffs of 25% offset about 40% of the cost difference vs. China." That is the Reshoring Initiative's calculation, not an official one, but it frames the problem clearly. A tariff narrows the gap between US and Chinese production cost; on that estimate, a 25% tariff does not close it.
Reshoring as a hedge, not an exit
For a small or mid-size importer, reshoring a product is usually a partial move: adding a domestic second source for part of the volume, or moving final assembly to the US while components remain imported. The sources reviewed here give no general answer to whether a given importer should reshore. The answer depends on the product's cost structure — how much of its cost is labor, materials, tooling and freight — and on the tariff stack that applies to its HTS line and origin.
The structural comparison is the same as for any change of source. It sets the landed cost of the imported product (unit price, freight, insurance, duties and fees, and the inventory carried in transit) against the domestic unit cost, and then weighs what landed cost leaves out: lead time, minimum order sizes, exposure to the next change in tariff law, and the cost of qualifying a new supplier. Tariff law changed repeatedly in 2025 and 2026, and a decision built on a single year's rates can be overtaken by the next instrument.
Common mistakes when reading reshoring data
- Reading announced jobs as jobs created. The Reshoring Initiative itself distinguishes about 1.8 million filled jobs from its larger announced total.
- Assuming tariffs alone make US production competitive. The Reshoring Initiative estimates that a 25% tariff offsets about 40% of the China cost gap.
- Treating reshoring as all-or-nothing. Most of the evidence shows import diversification instead: Kearney records China down about US$135 billion and other Asian low-cost countries up about US$194 billion in 2025.
- Citing one source alone. Announcement counts and import ratios answer different questions. A page, a report or a board presentation that uses only one of them will mislead.
- Quoting cumulative totals without the caveat. The Reshoring Initiative's report gives both 2.3 million and 2.8 million as jobs announced since 2010.
Frequently asked questions
Is reshoring actually happening?
Yes in announcements, not yet in the trade data. The Reshoring Initiative recorded about 247,000 announced reshoring plus FDI manufacturing jobs in 2025, the fifth straight year above 240,000. Kearney's 2026 index found that imports from 14 Asian low-cost countries still rose to 14.15% of US manufacturing output, from 13.29%. Both measures are accurate; they count different things.
What is reshoring in manufacturing?
Reshoring is moving manufacturing back to the United States from a foreign location, often China. The Reshoring Initiative counts it together with foreign direct investment, meaning foreign companies building production in the US. For most importers it is a partial move, such as a domestic second source or US final assembly, rather than a complete exit.
Which industries are reshoring to the US?
Transportation equipment led 2025 announcements with 48,786 jobs, followed by computer and electronic products (44,877), chemicals including pharmaceuticals (37,265), and electrical equipment including EV batteries (36,188), according to the Reshoring Initiative's 2025 report. Kearney found textiles, furniture and electrical equipment among the categories where domestic output gained slightly on Asian imports.
Where is reshored manufacturing coming from?
By 2025 jobs among cases reporting a country, South Korea led with 24,521, then China with 11,260 and Mexico with 10,368 (Reshoring Initiative, Exhibit 4.2). By number of cases, China is the largest source, at about two-thirds of reshoring cases that report an origin. A job count weights large plants heavily; a case count does not.
Do tariffs make reshoring worthwhile?
Not on their own, according to the main announcement tracker. The Reshoring Initiative estimates that a 25% tariff offsets about 40% of the cost difference with China. Tariff citations in reshoring announcements rose more than twelvefold in 2025, then declined in the first half of 2026 after the Supreme Court ended the IEEPA tariffs.
Do the CHIPS Act and IRA still drive reshoring?
Less than before. The Reshoring Initiative reports that citations of government incentives fell about 38% in 2025 as federal emphasis moved from the CHIPS and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act subsidies toward tariffs. The report says incentives influence where in the US a plant goes but do not, on their own, offset higher US costs.
Sources
- Reshoring Initiative — Reshoring Initiative 2025 Annual Report, Including 2026 1H Data
- Kearney — 2026 Reshoring Index (sidebar: How tariffs redirected sourcing away from China), p.5
- Supreme Court of the United States — Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), slip opinion
- klgates.com/Summary-Supreme-Court-Decision-on-IEEPA-Tariffs-2-20-2026
- en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offshoring