UFLPA Explained: Xinjiang, Entity List, Detentions

By ChinaManufacturers.com Editorial Desk · Updated 30 October 2026 · How this page was researched

What the UFLPA does

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA, Public Law 117-78) is a US statute that presumes goods linked to China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region were made with forced labor and therefore cannot enter the United States. It was signed on 23 December 2021, and its central mechanism, the rebuttable presumption, took effect on 21 June 2022.

The law works through an older provision. Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) has long prohibited the import of goods made with forced or indentured labor. Before the UFLPA, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had to build evidence against a specific product or producer before it could stop goods. The UFLPA reverses that burden for Xinjiang. CBP no longer has to prove forced labor; the importer has to prove its absence.

The reach is set by the words "wholly or in part." Goods here means any article mined, produced or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang, so a single input from the region is enough to trigger the presumption. The consequence is not a duty. It is a denial of entry: a shipment caught by the presumption is excluded, not taxed.

US law is the frame on this page because the UFLPA is a US admissibility rule. An importer in another country is not bound by it, but a Chinese or third-country supplier that also ships to the United States is affected by it, and so are its other customers.

The rebuttable presumption and the exception standard

Under UFLPA Section 3, two kinds of goods are presumed barred under 19 U.S.C. 1307:

goods mined, produced or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang; and
goods produced by an entity on the UFLPA Entity List, wherever that entity operates.

The presumption is "rebuttable," but the statute sets a high bar. CBP may grant an exception only if the importer meets all three conditions:

it has fully complied with the guidance of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) and any implementing regulations;
it has completely and substantively responded to every CBP request for information; and
it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the goods were not made wholly or in part with forced labor.

Clear and convincing evidence is a higher standard than the "more likely than not" test used in most civil matters. CBP must report every exception it grants to Congress. The number of exceptions granted has not been published in the research this page relies on, so this page does not state one.

An exception is not the only exit. An importer can instead argue that the presumption does not apply at all, because the goods have no Xinjiang input and no Entity List producer anywhere in the chain. CBP calls this an applicability review, and its evidentiary bar is lower than the exception standard. For an importer whose chain genuinely has no Xinjiang link, this is the route that matches the facts; the exception route is for chains that do touch Xinjiang or a listed producer.

The UFLPA Entity List

The UFLPA Entity List names companies and other entities whose goods fall under the presumption regardless of where those goods are made. It is maintained by the FLETF, a task force chaired by the Department of Homeland Security, and every change is published as a notice in the Federal Register.

As of 29 October 2026, the list holds 190 entities. The 29 October 2026 notice (91 FR 68159, FR Doc. 2026-22094) added three: BGI Genomics Co., Ltd.; MGI Tech Co., Ltd.; and Shenzhen BGI Technology Co., Ltd. That notice was read through a mirror of the Federal Register text, because the official federalregister.gov page returned an error when the research was compiled; the figure should be re-checked against the official page.

The list has grown quickly:

19 August 2025: 144 entities, after 78 additions in the prior year (USTR release on the 2025 UFLPA Strategy update).
3 August 2026: 43 entities added, for a total of 187, the largest single expansion to date (91 FR 48913, FR Doc. 2026-15628). Additions spanned pharmaceuticals, metals and mining (including Tianshan Aluminum, TBEA and Shandong Gold entities, plus lithium and potash producers), food and agriculture (tomatoes, sugar, salmon), textiles (including Weiqiao Textile and Septwolves) and battery materials.
29 October 2026: three BGI-group entities added, for 190.

Two practical points follow. First, the list changes several times a year, so a supplier screen run in the spring can be out of date by autumn. Second, the presumption attaches to the listed producer's goods even when they are made outside Xinjiang, and it follows them into finished products assembled elsewhere.

The UFLPA Entity List is not the same as the Commerce Department's Entity List, which restricts US exports to named parties, and it is not China's Unreliable Entity List. The three lists have different owners, legal bases and consequences.

High-priority sectors

The FLETF's UFLPA Strategy names sectors where CBP concentrates enforcement. The original and 2024 priorities were apparel, cotton and cotton products, silica-based products (including polysilicon, the base material of most solar cells), tomatoes, aluminum, PVC (polyvinyl chloride, a common plastic used in flooring, pipe and packaging) and seafood. The 2025 Strategy Update of 19 August 2025 added five more: caustic soda, copper, lithium, red dates and steel. CBP's June 2026 guidance, as summarized by the law firm Holland & Knight, lists the same scrutinized sectors.

The sector list matters because exposure follows inputs, not finished-product categories. A few examples drawn from the research:

Cotton. About 85% of China's cotton comes from Xinjiang, according to the US International Trade Commission (USITC Pub. 5543, 2024, citing CBP). Any cotton garment, towel or bag with Chinese fiber anywhere in its chain carries risk.
Polysilicon. A solar module assembled in Southeast Asia can still be detained if its polysilicon traces to a listed producer.
Aluminum and PVC. Both are industrial inputs, so exposure can sit inside finished goods whose own category is not on the priority list.
Lithium and copper. Both feed battery and electronics supply chains, which explains why electronics dominate detentions by value.

Enforcement in numbers

CBP publishes UFLPA statistics on a public dashboard. The figures below cover June 2022 through August 2026, with data current as of 4 September 2026. They come from a third-party compilation of CBP's dashboard by the Gatewell Group, because CBP's own page was not retrievable when the research was compiled; Gatewell notes a country-value discrepancy equal to one $196.8 million row. Treat them as indicative and re-check them on CBP's dashboard.

Measure	Shipments	Value
Stopped (total)	44,188	$4.13 billion
Denied	26,830 (60.7%)	$1.00 billion
Released	15,318 (34.7%)	$2.98 billion
Pending	2,040	$148.2 million
Electronics	7,217	$3.40 billion
Apparel, footwear and textiles	13,564	$101.6 million
Automotive and aerospace	9,054	$113.2 million

By origin, China accounted for 23,670 stopped shipments, Vietnam for 6,963 and Malaysia for 4,151; Malaysia was the highest origin by value, at $1.63 billion. A separate CBP figure, cited in its June 2026 guidance as summarized by Holland & Knight, puts fiscal 2025 through April of fiscal 2026 at 17,651 shipments detained and 10,959 denied, worth about $294.76 million, with electronics the largest category by value at about $179.67 million.

Three readings stand out. Electronics lead by value while apparel leads by count, so a single electronics detention can tie up far more money. Roughly six in ten stopped shipments were denied. And nearly half of stopped shipments originated outside China, which is the clearest evidence that the UFLPA follows Xinjiang inputs into third-country factories.

What happens when CBP detains a shipment

CBP's "Forced Labor Enforcement Operational Guidance for Importers," issued on 9 June 2026, replaced the UFLPA-only guidance CBP had used since 2022. As summarized by Holland & Knight on 8 July 2026, the process runs as follows:

Detention notice. CBP holds the goods at entry and issues a notice to the importer.
30-day response window. The importer has 30 days to respond through CBP's Forced Labor Portal.
Choice of response. The importer can seek an applicability review (no Xinjiang or Entity List nexus), request an exception (clear and convincing evidence), or export or abandon the goods.
180 days for directly linked goods. For goods directly linked to Xinjiang or to an Entity List producer, importers have 180 days to export, destroy or protest the decision and submit evidence.

The response window matters as much as the evidentiary standard. An importer that cannot produce documents in 30 days is usually in a weak position regardless of the underlying facts.

What evidence CBP expects

CBP expects traceability, not assurances. In practice that means a documented chain from the finished article back to the raw material: the cotton bale, the quartzite behind the polysilicon, the smelter behind the aluminum. A typical file includes:

a supplier map naming every tier that touched the goods or their inputs;
purchase orders, invoices and proof of payment at each tier;
production and inventory records showing which input lots went into which output lots;
transport documents linking each movement of material; and
screening records showing each named party was checked against the current Entity List.

Social-compliance audits help, but they do not substitute for this chain. An audit describes a factory's labor conditions on a given day. It does not show where that factory's yarn, resin or wafers came from, which is the question the presumption asks.

UFLPA versus the 2026 forced-labor tariff, and common mistakes

A separate measure with a similar name took effect in 2026. On 24 July 2026, a Section 301 action on forced-labor enforcement imposed a 12.5% additional duty on products of China (HTS 9903.05.31). That is a tariff, paid on goods that do enter. The UFLPA is an admissibility rule that keeps goods out. Paying the Section 301 duty does nothing to rebut the UFLPA presumption, and clearing a UFLPA review does nothing to reduce the tariff.

The mistakes that recur in the research are consistent:

Assuming the law reaches only goods shipped from Xinjiang. It reaches goods made "in part" with Xinjiang inputs anywhere, which is why Vietnam and Malaysia rank high in detentions.
Screening only the direct supplier. The presumption attaches at any tier, so sub-tier input suppliers must be screened too.
Relying on audits alone. CBP asks for traceability documents.
Missing the 30-day window. Documents assembled after detention are often assembled too late.
Using a stale Entity List. The list grew from 144 to 190 entities between August 2025 and October 2026.

A licensed customs broker or trade attorney should review any detention response before it is filed; the evidentiary record submitted is usually the record that decides the outcome.

Frequently asked questions

What is the UFLPA?

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is a US law, signed 23 December 2021, that presumes goods made wholly or in part in Xinjiang, or by an entity on the UFLPA Entity List, were made with forced labor. Since 21 June 2022, CBP has denied entry to such goods under 19 U.S.C. 1307 unless the importer rebuts the presumption.

How many companies are on the UFLPA Entity List?

As of 29 October 2026, the list holds 190 entities, after a notice (91 FR 68159) added three BGI-group companies. The 3 August 2026 update had added 43 entities for a total of 187, and the list stood at 144 in August 2025. Check the Federal Register before relying on any count, because the list changes several times a year.

Does the UFLPA apply to goods made in Vietnam or Malaysia?

Yes. The presumption applies to any good made wholly or in part with Xinjiang inputs or by a listed entity, wherever the final product is assembled. CBP dashboard data compiled by Gatewell show 6,963 stopped shipments from Vietnam and 4,151 from Malaysia between June 2022 and August 2026, with Malaysia the top origin by value.

What evidence do I need to rebut the UFLPA presumption?

To win an exception you need clear and convincing evidence that the goods were not made with forced labor, plus full compliance with FLETF guidance and complete answers to CBP. Showing that the goods have no Xinjiang or Entity List link at all, through an applicability review, carries a lower bar but still requires full supply-chain tracing documents.

How long do I have to respond to a UFLPA detention?

You have 30 days from the detention notice to respond through CBP's Forced Labor Portal, according to CBP's June 2026 importer guidance as summarized by Holland & Knight. For goods directly linked to Xinjiang or a listed entity, importers have 180 days to export, destroy or protest and submit evidence.

How many shipments has CBP stopped under the UFLPA?

CBP stopped 44,188 shipments worth about $4.13 billion from June 2022 through August 2026, according to a Gatewell Group compilation of CBP's dashboard dated 4 September 2026. About 60.7% were denied and 34.7% released. CBP's own dashboard should be checked, because the compiler notes a value discrepancy.

Is the UFLPA the same as the Section 301 forced-labor tariff?

No. The UFLPA bars goods from entry; the Section 301 forced-labor action, effective 24 July 2026, adds a 12.5% duty on products of China that do enter (HTS 9903.05.31). An importer can owe the tariff on compliant goods and still lose a different shipment to a UFLPA detention.

UFLPA explained for importers