Solar panel manufacturing in China

Volume has shifted elsewhere. Split verdict: China held about 80% of global module supply in 2024 (IEA), but US-bound Chinese modules face 50% Section 301, AD/CVD and UFLPA.

Is China still the default source for solar panels?

For most of the world, yes; for US-bound cells and modules, no. A solar panel (also called a PV module — photovoltaic cells laminated with glass, encapsulant, backsheet and frame) is made in a chain of stages, and China leads every one of them: it supplied about 80% of global module demand in 2024 and about 90% of upstream wafers and polysilicon, according to the International Energy Agency's Energy Technology Perspectives 2026. Under stated policies, the IEA projects China's module share at over 70% by 2030.

The US verdict is different. Chinese-origin cells and modules entering the United States carry a 50% Section 301 duty, long-standing antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD — a duty that offsets a foreign government subsidy) orders, detention risk under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), and, from December 4, 2026, a Section 232 duty with minimum import prices. US module supply had already moved: in the five years to 2021 the US imported 77% of its installed modules (the EU 84%, India 75%), and Southeast Asian module makers produced one-third of global module exports in 2017–2021, mostly for the US and EU (IEA, 2022). That period predates the 2025 AD/CVD orders on Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, which now cover that route as well.

The pill on this page reads "no" because most readers are US-bound. An importer serving the EU, India, Brazil, Australia or the Middle East faces a different answer: there, Chinese modules remain the default, and the IEA's 2022 report found China's share of India's and Brazil's module imports exceeded 90% in 2017–2021.

Where solar panels are made in China

The best province-level map is the IEA's 2022 Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains (p. 58). It uses 2021 capacity data, so its shares are lower than the 2024 figures above, but no later source gives the same provincial detail.

The IEA report gives two Xinjiang figures that should not be merged: its stage table attributes 42% of polysilicon capacity to Xinjiang, while its executive summary says Xinjiang accounted for 40% of global polysilicon manufacturing. Either way, Xinjiang is the point where solar supply chains meet the UFLPA.

Scale has grown since. In 2023 China produced 545 GW of the world's 600 GW of solar cells and held 930 GW of the world's 1,032 GW of cell capacity; it exported 211 GW of solar panels worth USD 38.8 billion that year (HKUST Li & Fung Supply Chain Institute, February 2025). China also installed about 357.3 GW in 2024, nearly 60% of new global capacity (IEA PVPS).

How the solar supply chain is organized

Polysilicon is cast into ingots and sliced into wafers; wafers are processed into cells; cells are laminated into modules. Module assembly is the least concentrated stage, which is why it was the first to move offshore.

Large vertically integrated Chinese groups sell modules directly, through distributors or through overseas subsidiaries. Small importers usually buy finished modules from distributors or trading companies. A product listing does not show where the cell or the polysilicon came from; only supply-chain tracing documents do.

Module offers are quoted per watt (USD/W), usually FOB (Free On Board — the seller's cost and risk end once goods are loaded at the named Chinese port) or DDP (Delivered Duty Paid — the seller carries duty and delivery to the buyer's door). The price is driven by polysilicon cost, cell technology (PERC, TOPCon, HJT or back-contact), the wattage bin, freight, and the duty stack at destination. Under the 2026 Section 232 action, entered value relative to a per-watt minimum import price also affects the duty owed.

US compliance: origin, UFLPA and traceability

Origin follows the cell for AD/CVD. The scope language of the crystalline silicon PV orders reads "cells, whether or not assembled into modules," so the country where the cell is made generally determines which order applies, not the country where the module is assembled. Orders differ, so confirm the scope of each order for a specific product with a licensed customs broker or trade attorney.

UFLPA follows the polysilicon. The UFLPA creates a rebuttable presumption that goods made wholly or partly in Xinjiang, or by entities on the UFLPA Entity List, are barred from entry. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforces it at the border. Polysilicon is the exposure point. On January 14, 2025, DHS added 37 entities to the list; trade-press summaries of that announcement identify solar-related additions including Donghai JA Solar Technology, Jiangsu Meike Solar and Baotou Meike Silicon Energy, and Shuangliang Silicon Materials (Baotou), alongside earlier polysilicon listees such as Hoshine Silicon, Xinjiang Daqo, Xinjiang East Hope and Xinjiang GCL. The DHS Federal Register notice itself was not reviewed for this page. The list stood at 190 entities after its October 29, 2026 update, a count read from a reproduction of that Federal Register notice.

A third-party compilation of CBP data counts 44,188 shipments of all product types stopped under the UFLPA from June 2022 through August 2026, 60.7% of them denied; it could not be confirmed on CBP's own pages and has no solar breakdown. To rebut the presumption, an importer should expect to assemble polysilicon-to-module traceability: polysilicon supplier invoices, production records and transport records for each stage.

US tariffs on Chinese solar cells and modules, as of October 2026

The 2012 and 2015 China-wide orders are commonly cited as A-570-979 and C-570-980, but their case numbers and current deposit rates were not confirmed for this page.

Proclamation 11052 (signed August 6, 2026) adds a 15% duty on polysilicon derivatives (ingots and wafers under HTSUS 3818.00, cells under 8541.42.00, modules under 8541.43.00) and sets minimum import prices collected as specific duties: USD 21/kg for polysilicon, USD 100/kg for ingots and wafers, USD 0.22/W for cells and USD 0.38/W for modules. An importer that does not file pricing documentation pays a specific tariff equal to the full minimum price. Reduced rates apply to the UK, EU, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, not China. The action was not yet in effect on October 30, 2026, and Commerce may adjust the minimum prices before then. For low-priced modules the per-watt floor matters more than the 15% headline rate. Whether goods covered by this action will drop out of the 12.5% forced-labor layer, as other Section 232 goods do, has not been confirmed in the instruments read.

Two layers are gone. The Section 201 safeguard on cells and modules, in place since January 2018, expired in February 2026. The IEEPA duties ended after the Supreme Court's February 20, 2026 decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump; that ruling did not touch Section 301, AD/CVD or Section 232.

Where solar production is shifting, and why

First shift (2012–2024): Southeast Asia. Chinese groups built cell and module plants in Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia, which the IEA says were built "mainly to circumvent US import tariffs." That route has largely closed. The US International Trade Commission's final determination of June 9, 2025 found material injury (Malaysia, Vietnam) and threat (Cambodia, Thailand), and CVD orders were published June 24, 2025 (90 FR 26791). All-others CVD rates are Cambodia 534.67%, Malaysia 34.09%, Thailand 255.39% and Vietnam 124.57%, with company rates up to 3,403.96% (Cambodia, adverse facts available). These are cash-deposit rates subject to administrative review, and the separate AD orders carry their own rates, not covered here.

Second shift (2024–2026): the US and new hubs. IEA PVPS reports US module capacity above 40 GW per year at end-2024, plus 10 GW of polysilicon under construction and about 15 GW of cell and module projects in Oman (Sohar) and 3 GW of modules in Egypt. The IEA says US domestic module production share rose 40 percentage points in 2023–2025 and that US policies lead to "near-self-sufficiency for modules by 2030." India had more than 60 GW per year of module capacity commissioned or ramping by end-2024, and the IEA projects its share of PV manufacturing rising from 4% (2024) to 10% (2030).

Upstream stays in China. Even when cells or modules are made elsewhere, wafers and polysilicon remained about 90% Chinese in 2024. That is why the Section 232 action targets polysilicon derivatives regardless of assembly country, and why the US share of global polysilicon capacity, 50% in 2005 and under 2% in 2024, matters to the policy (Proclamation 11052).

Common mistakes, and how to evaluate a solar supplier

• Treating module assembly country as the origin that matters. AD/CVD scope follows the cell and the UFLPA follows the polysilicon, so a "Made in Vietnam" or "Made in Indonesia" module can still raise Chinese-cell AD/CVD questions and UFLPA detention.
• Assuming Section 201 still applies. It expired in February 2026; the Section 232 minimum-price regime takes over from December 4, 2026.
• Using pre-2024 duty stacks. Section 301 on Chinese cells rose from 25% to 50% in September 2024, and on polysilicon and wafers to 50% in January 2025.
• Ignoring AD/CVD deposit exposure. The importer of record carries the liability, and final duties can be set years later through administrative review.
• Under-documenting the supply chain. An importer who cannot trace polysilicon loses the shipment, not just a duty payment.

A solar supplier is evaluated on documents before price. Ask for the country of manufacture of the cell, not just the module, and for the wafer and polysilicon sources behind it. Ask whether the supplier can provide stage-by-stage traceability records of the kind CBP accepts to rebut the UFLPA presumption, and whether any entity in its chain appears on the UFLPA Entity List. Confirm the cell technology and wattage bin in writing, and model landed cost under the Section 232 minimum import price, not only the ad valorem rates.

Frequently asked questions

Sources

• International Energy Agency (IEA) — Energy Technology Perspectives 2026, chapter 'Energy technology manufacturing and trade' (2026, HTML-official)
• International Energy Agency (IEA) — Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains (July 2022), trade chapter (2022, PDF)
• Office of the U.S. Trade Representative / Federal Register — USTR Notice of Modification, 89 FR 76581 (Sept. 18, 2024), FR Doc. 2024-21217, docket U… (2024, HTML-official)
• U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration / Federal Register — Commerce notice, amended final CVD determinations and CVD order… (2025, HTML-official)
• The White House / Federal Register — Proclamation 11052, Adjusting Imports of Polysilicon and Its Derivatives Into the United States, 91 FR 51975 (A… (2026, HTML-official)
• ustlfsci.hkust.edu.hk/sites/default/files/Global_Supply_Chain_Report_Solar_P…
• iea-pvps.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Snapshot-of-Global-PV-Markets_2025.pdf
• govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-16/html/2024-29462.htm